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PARAPHRASE AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY
Joseph Jedwab and John A. Keller
The Doctrine of the Trinity says that there is one God, that there are three di-
vine Persons, and that each divine Person is God. The Logical Problem of the 
Trinity is that these claims seem logically inconsistent. We argue that any co-
herent and orthodox solution to the Logical Problem must use the technique 
of paraphrase: a logically or metaphysically more perspicuous reformulation. 
If so, discussions of paraphrase deserve more prominence in the literature 
on the Doctrine of the Trinity. We also show that such explicit discussion has 
important implications for theorizing about the Trinity.
1. Introduction
According to Christian orthodoxy, as stated in the Athanasian Creed,
The Father’s person is one, the Son’s another, the Holy Spirit’s another. . . . 
Thus the Father is God, the Son God, the Holy Spirit God; and yet there are 
not three Gods, but there is one God.1
Similar claims can be found in other important creeds, Scripture, conciliar 
documents, and in the writings of Christian theologians from the time of 
Christ to the present.2 These claims constitute the core of the Doctrine of 
the Trinity (hereafter, “the Doctrine”). The Logical Problem of the Trinity 
(hereafter, “the Problem”) is that the following tenets of the Doctrine seem 
logically inconsistent:
(1) There is exactly one God.
(2) There are exactly three divine persons.
(3) Each divine person is God.
In this paper, we argue that any solution to the Problem must in-
volve—at least implicitly—a paraphrase of the Doctrine: a logically or 
metaphysically more perspicuous reformulation of (1) – (3). If this is 
correct, explicit thought and discussion about paraphrase deserve more 
prominence in the literature on the Doctrine: inattentiveness toward the 
1Kelly, Athanasian Creed, 18.
2See § 2.2.
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role of paraphrase in theorizing about the Trinity leads us to underappre-
ciate certain puzzles facing standard “solutions” to the Problem—puzzles 
that come to light when they are viewed, in part, as proposals for how to 
paraphrase (1) – (3).
We begin by explicating the notion of paraphrase and showing how 
standard versions of Relative-Identity, Social, and Latin Trinitarian ac-
counts rely on this technique. Next, we argue that any solution to the 
Problem involves paraphrase, at least implicitly. We then explain some 
of the special hurdles one faces when paraphrasing carefully formulated 
theses like the Doctrine. Finally, we argue that explicit consideration of the 
nature of paraphrase provides support for Relative-Identity accounts of 
the Trinity—a claim that is compatible, we wish to stress, with there being 
conclusive reasons for preferring another account.
2. The Method of Paraphrase
First things first though: what is paraphrase? A paraphrase is a reformula-
tion, a new sentence, that is intended to be more logically or metaphysically 
perspicuous than the original. But there are two importantly different 
types of reformulation, corresponding to two importantly different goals 
one could have in reformulating:
Revising paraphrases are intended to revise what is said: to be sentences 
with different and better contents than the originals. Revising para-
phrases are given when some otherwise attractive sentence is false, or 
at least inconsistent with one’s commitments. The paraphrase is then 
proposed as a replacement that (a) makes roughly the same claim as 
the original, (b) has many or all of the original’s attractive features, 
and (c) is true, or at least consistent with one’s commitments.3 Revising 
paraphrases are intended to be more perspicuous, then, by being more 
accurate—by being “strictly and literally true,” as philosophers some-
times say.
Reconciling paraphrases are intended to preserve what is said: their pur-
pose is to clarify the contents of the originals, so as to show that the 
originals do not need to be revised.4 Reconciling paraphrases are given 
when one takes some sentence to be true but misleading as to its log-
ical or metaphysical implications. The paraphrase is intended to clarify 
3Revising paraphrases are sometimes used to explain the difference between false sen-
tences that are “good” (those that intelligent and informed people are inclined to assert) and 
those that are “bad” (those that intelligent and informed people are not inclined to assert). 
The “good” false sentences are those that are “nearly true” in virtue of the presence of a 
nearby truth—i.e., the revising paraphrase.
4Surprisingly, as we will see below, they don’t need to do this by having the same content 
as the originals themselves. The terminology here is taken from Keller's, “Paraphrase, Se-
mantics, and Ontology.” Burgess and Rosen's “Nominalism,” uses the labels “Revolutionary 
Paraphrases” and “Hermeneutic Paraphrases” for essentially the same distinction; Tuggy's 
“On Positive Mysterianism,” similarly distinguishes between “Rational Reinterpretations” 
and “Revisions” of the Doctrine.
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those implications. Reconciling paraphrases are meant to be more per-
spicuous, then, in the sense of being more clear than the originals.
It is difficult to give uncontroversial examples of these two kinds of 
paraphrase, since whether one judges (and so could reasonably intend) a 
paraphrase to be reconciling or revising depends on one’s overall theory. 
Berkeley, for example, intended to be giving (in effect) reconciling para-
phrases of our talk about ordinary physical objects—paraphrases that 
reconcile that talk with the non-existence of matter—but most subsequent 
philosophers have thought that Berkeley’s paraphrases were clearly revi-
sionary.5
Applied to the Problem, revising paraphrases concede that the Doctrine, 
as originally formulated at least, is inconsistent and attempt to replace it 
with something new and improved: a consistent revision of the Doctrine. 
Reconciling paraphrases, on the other hand, are attempts to reconcile and 
so defend the logical consistency of (1) – (3): to show that the traditional 
Doctrine itself—the doctrine held by patristic and medieval theologians—
merely appears inconsistent and so does not need to be revised.
2.1 The Importance of Reconciliation
The distinction between revising and reconciling paraphrases is im-
portant, and one benefit of explicitly thinking about the role of paraphrase 
in theorizing about the Doctrine is that it brings this distinction to the 
fore. An account of the Trinity is not just an account of the properties of 
and relations among the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—even non-Trini-
tarians like Dale Tuggy have an account of that. The problematic tenets 
of the Doctrine are specific claims, and to defend the logical consistency 
of the Doctrine is to defend the logical consistency of those claims. It is 
easy to lose sight of this. For example, Shieva Kleinschmidt’s “Simple 
Trinitarianism” complements the present paper in important ways, but 
her focus is on giving a (consistent) interpretation of the Doctrine, rather 
than arguing that the (correct) interpretation of the Doctrine is consistent.6 
In other words, her paper is unconcerned with whether her paraphrase 
(or interpretation) of the Doctrine is reconciling or revising. Thus, her 
paper, while containing many valuable insights and arguments, contains 
5This judgment is influenced by the fact that most subsequent philosophers have thought 
that Berkeley’s metaphysics was clearly false. If Berkeley’s picture of the world were correct, 
it would be more plausible (although perhaps still implausible) that his paraphrases were 
reconciling. See Keller, “Paraphrase, Semantics, and Ontology” § 4.2 and (to a lesser extent) 
§ 5 of this essay for related discussion.
6Providing a consistent interpretation (or model) of a set of sentences S is a common 
method of demonstrating the consistency of S in mathematics or logic. This method works, 
however, only if we already know the logical forms of the statements in S. But that is just what 
we’re trying to determine with respect to (1) – (3). As Branson notes, “Once we define the 
problem carefully, we can see that what is really being disputed is the very logical form of the 
[D]octrine itself, and that different proposed solutions correspond to different logical forms 
attributed to the [D]octrine” (Logical Problem of the Trinity, 2).
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a significant lacuna for anyone wishing to defend the actual historical 
Doctrine of the Trinity.7
In any case, our view is that every solution to the Problem will em-
ploy, at least implicitly, some form of paraphrase: orthodox solutions will 
employ reconciling paraphrases (they’re trying to show that the Doctrine 
is consistent), and heterodox solutions will employ revising paraphrases 
(they’re trying to replace the Doctrine with something consistent). Our 
focus in this essay is on the role of reconciling paraphrases in defenses of 
the actual, traditional, Doctrine of the Trinity.8 Different people and de-
nominations will have different levels of allegiance to “tradition,” but by 
most Christians’ lights it would be preferable if we didn’t have to revise a 
thesis of such central theological importance.
2.2 The History of the Doctrine
To understand the importance of preserving the traditional Doctrine, a 
few words about its history are in order. The most authoritative statement 
of the Doctrine can be found in the Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, 
the first two of which respond to Trinitarian controversies. The Councils 
continue to have authority in the Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and 
many Protestant traditions. The First Council of Nicaea (325 AD) con-
demns the Arian heresy which says that the Son is created and so not 
God, and the First Council of Constantinople (381 AD) condemns, among 
others, the Semi-Arian heresy which says the Holy Spirit is created and so 
not God.
According to the Exposition of the 150 Fathers from the First Council 
of Constantinople:
We believe in one God the Father all-powerful . . . And in one Lord Jesus 
Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, begotten from the Father before all the 
ages . . . true God from true God . . . consubstantial with the Father . . . and in 
7We defend two other claims that are in apparent tension with Kleinschmidt’s paper. 
First, Kleinschmidt seems to think that her “interpretational” approach to the Problem is 
novel. To the contrary, we argue in § 4 that every account of the Trinity involves, at least 
implicitly, a paraphrase—in effect, an interpretation of the Doctrine. Second, her focus is 
on giving an interpretation of “ordinary sentences about the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit” 
(Kleinschmidt, “Simple Trinitarianism,” 258). But theological discourse is not ordinary lan-
guage—people use language carelessly in the ordinary business of life, and so we can and 
should often interpret ordinary speakers as not saying (or writing) exactly what they mean. 
But as we argue in § 5.1, this is much less plausible for theological—especially, conciliar—
discourse about the Trinity, which was formulated with great care and after extensive debate 
and deliberation. (Although this is perhaps offset by the fact that, according to Branson, 
Logical Problem of the Trinity, 103–108, the creeds included in many conciliar documents were 
intended to be easily memorized summaries of important doctrine that were understandable 
to laypeople.)
8This is partly because there isn’t much of philosophical interest to say about revising 
paraphrases: there are various practical constraints on what sort of revisions one could rea-
sonably expect people to accept, and there are theological constraints about what revisions 
could do the theological “work” required of the Doctrine, but both sets of constraints will 
vary greatly between religious communities.
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the Spirit, the holy, the lordly and life-giving one, proceeding forth from the 
Father, co-worshipped and co-glorified with Father and Son.9
And according to the Letter of Bishops gathered in Constantinople the 
following year, the Nicene Creed teaches that:
The Father, the Son, and the holy Spirit have a single Godhead and power 
and substance, a dignity deserving the same honor and a co-eternal sover-
eignty, in three most perfect hypostases, or three perfect persons. So there 
is no place for Sabellius’s diseased theory. . . . Nor may the blasphemy of 
Eunomians and Arians and Pneumatomachi prevail.10
Finally, Canon 1 of the First Council of Constantinople says,
Every heresy is to be anathematized and in particular that of the Eunomians 
or Anomoeans, that of the Arians or Eudoxians, that of the Semi-Arians or 
Pneumatomachi, that of the Sabellians.11
The Eunomian (or Anomoian) heresy says the Son’s nature is unlike the 
Father’s nature (“Anomoios” means unlike). The Arian (or Eudoxian) heresy 
says the Son’s nature is not the same as the Father’s and so the Son is not 
truly God. The Semi-Arian (or Pneumatomachian) heresy says the Holy 
Spirit’s nature is not the same as the Father’s and so the Holy Spirit is not 
truly God (“Pneumatomachi” means fighter against the Spirit). Finally, the 
Sabellian heresy says there are no real distinctions among the Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit, and hence that the Father is the same person as the Son 
and Holy Spirit.
The Decrees of the Councils seem to straightforwardly imply (1) – (3). 
That there is only one God is implied by the Exposition’s claim that “We 
believe in one God” and the Letter’s claim that the divine persons “have a 
single Godhead and power and substance.”12 That there are three divine 
persons is implied by the Letter’s claim that “the Father, the Son, and the 
holy Spirit have a single Godhead . . . in three most perfect hypostases, 
or three perfect persons.” And the Exposition implies each divine person 
is God. It implies the Father is God, since it says, “We believe in one God 
the Father.” It implies the Son is God, since the Son is “true God from 
true God,” and the Son is “consubstantial with” (i.e., has the same nature 
as) the Father, who is God. And the Exposition implies the Spirit is God, 
since it says the Spirit is “co-worshipped and co-glorified with Father 
and Son.” Lewis Ayres, an historian of the early church, notes that the 
Exposition seems to reflect work on the Holy Spirit by Gregory of Nyssa, 
who “argues that if we worship the Spirit we must also imagine the Spirit 
involved in the same activities as Father and Son and hence sharing the 
9Tanner, Decrees, 24.
10Tanner, Decrees, 28.
11Tanner, Decrees, 31.
12See also Isaiah 45.5. Monotheism is, in any case, a core Christian commitment.
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same nature.”13 Of course, even if the Spirit weren’t God, the “Problem of 
the Bi-nity” would be no easier to solve than the Problem of the Trinity.
2.3 Content Preservation
The Doctrine, then, has a long and distinguished history: if we are wrong 
about the Trinity, orthodox Christian theology is on shaky foundations 
indeed. Furthermore, the Doctrine was very carefully formulated: it’s im-
plausible that some revisionary account of the Trinity is going to be what 
the Church Fathers were trying to express all along—a revision to what 
they said but not to what they meant to say (see § 5.2 for more on this 
possibility). So, it is important, we think, to preserve the traditional Doc-
trine: for our paraphrases to be reconciling rather than revising. The goal 
of reconciling paraphrases, recall, is to reconcile apparently inconsistent 
claims: to clarify the content of the original sentence so as to show that it 
is consistent with one’s other commitments. In our case, reconcilers want 
to argue that the Doctrine is not self-contradictory: to argue that (1) – (3) 
are logically consistent.14 The basic strategy for such arguments is to find 
statements (1*) – (3*) such that it is reasonable to believe:
(1*) is logically equivalent to (1)
(2*) is logically equivalent to (2)
(3*) is logically equivalent to (3)
and,
(1*) – (3*) are logically consistent.
Call the first three steps of this strategy Stage 1 and the fourth step Stage 2. 
There are three important things to note about this strategy.
First, there is a trade-off in how easy it is to complete these two stages. 
Stage 1 can be made maximally easy by making (1*) – (3*) = (1) – (3). But 
then we will have made no progress on Stage 2, which reduces to our orig-
inal problem of arguing that (1) – (3) are consistent. Alternatively, Stage 2 
can be made maximally easy by, say, letting (1*) = ‘1 + 1 = 2’, (2*) = ‘2 + 2 = 4’, 
and (3*) = ‘3 + 3 = 6’. But then Stage 1 is maximally difficult. In actual cases, 
Stage 1 is typically the more difficult.
13Ayres, Nicaea, 257. See also Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration, 31.28: “I stand . . . able to 
worship the Father as God, the Son as God, the Holy Spirit as God—‘three personalities, one 
Godhead undivided in glory, honor, substance, and sovereignty’”; Augustine, The Trinity, 
V.9: “the Father is God and the Son is God and the Holy Spirit is God, and no one denies 
that this is said substance-wise; and yet we say that this supreme triad is not three Gods but 
one God.”
14Two sentences are logically consistent if and only if no contradiction follows from them 
when they have been properly regimented. Similarly, two sentences are logically equivalent 
if and only if each follows from the other when properly regimented. Note that logical equiv-
alence isn’t a matter of having the same logical form: “Izzy is tall” and “Isaac is tall” have the 
same logical form, but neither follows from the other.
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Second, even though Stage 1 is difficult, it is not as difficult as it would 
be if it required synonymy—semantic equivalence. Intuitively, synonymy 
entails logical equivalence, but not vice versa, since semantic equivalence 
is more “fine-grained” than logical equivalence: some sentences express 
distinct but logically equivalent propositions. For example, it’s plausible 
that “Pat is Chris’s parent” is logically but not semantically equivalent 
to “Chris is Pat’s child”: the sentences express distinct propositions, but 
the propositions they express logically entail each other. Likewise, with 
“1 < 2” and “2 > 1.” Stage 1 of a reconciliation project does not, then, re-
quire the paraphrases and the paraphrased to be synonymous: showing 
that the literal content of the Doctrine is consistent does not require using para-
phrases that express the literal content of the Doctrine. Logically equivalent 
paraphrases are enough to show that the Doctrine is consistent. However, 
and this is important, arguing for semantic equivalence—arguing that the 
paraphrase and the paraphrased “mean the same thing”—is a common 
and important way of arguing for logical equivalence. It makes sense to 
ask whether (1*) – (3*) mean the same thing as (1) – (3), since an affirmative 
answer is sufficient for Stage 1’s being a success. It’s just not necessary.
Third, logical equivalence is not even necessary for Stage 1 to succeed. 
If (1*) – (3*) have the same “logical form” as (1) – (3), or if (1*) – (3*) logically 
entail (1) – (3), that suffices for reconciliation (in conjunction with Stage 2). 
Indeed, if our ultimate goal is to determine whether some set of claims is 
metaphysically compossible—whether there is a metaphysically possible 
world where they are all true—it suffices to show that the paraphrases 
are necessarily stronger than or equivalent to the originals, and that the 
paraphrases are metaphysically compossible. In the present context, that 
would mean showing:
 (1* ⊃ 1)
 (2* ⊃ 2)
 (3* ⊃ 3)
and,
◊ (1* ∧ 2* ∧ 3*).
Since logically inconsistent statements are metaphysically incompossible, 
it follows that if a set of statements is metaphysically compossible it is log-
ically consistent. Hence, the Logical Problem of the Trinity can be solved by 
the above method. That being said, appealing to metaphysical as opposed 
to logical equivalence and consistency gives rise to difficulties when para-
phrasing non-contingent claims. Anyone who has reason to think that 
(1) – (3) are necessarily true will thereby have reason to think that  (1 + 1 = 2 
⊃ (1)),  (2 + 2 = 4 ⊃ (2)), and  (3 + 3 = 6 ⊃ (3)). And of course, we all have 
reason to think that ◊ (1 + 1 = 2 ∧ 2 + 2 = 4 ∧ 3 + 3 = 6). But then it looks like 
providing a reconciling paraphrase of (1) – (3) is trivial for anyone who has 
reason to think that those statements are necessarily true. To avoid this 
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sort of concern, we will focus on logical equivalence and consistency in 
what follows.
3. Paraphrase in Existing Accounts
In the contemporary literature, three approaches to the Trinity dominate: 
Relative-Identity, Social, and Latin Trinitarian accounts.15 We will take the 
accounts of Peter van Inwagen, Richard Swinburne, and Brian Leftow as 
representative of these approaches. Social accounts start with three divine 
persons and try to explain how there could be one God. Latin accounts 
start with one God and try to explain how there could be three divine 
persons. Relative-Identity accounts don’t try to explain any of this: rather, 
they defend the consistency of the Doctrine by developing an account that 
implies that not every relative-identity relation is reducible to classical 
identity. In what follows, we briefly explicate these accounts and the role 
of paraphrase therein.
3.1 Van Inwagen’s Relative-Identity Trinitarian Account
According to Relative-Identity accounts, the Doctrine can be taken at face 
value: Father, Son, and Spirit are the same God but different divine per-
sons. To explain how the logic of relative identity makes this possible, we 
need some terminology.
3.1.1 Relative-Identity Terminology. Where “R” stands for a count noun, 
and where any claim of the form “a is the same R as b” implies a claim 
of the form “a and b are Rs,” call any predicate of the form “is the same 
R as” a relative-identity predicate (RI-predicate): e.g., “is the same cat as.” 
And call any predicate that is not an RI-predicate an ordinary predicate: e.g., 
“purrs.” The relation any RI-predicate expresses must be both symmetric 
and transitive but needn’t be reflexive (since, e.g., Izzy is not the same cat 
as herself, as she is not a cat).16
Next, say that an RI-predicate R dominates a predicate F just if R forces 
indiscernibility with respect to F. For example, “being the same cat as” 
dominates “purrs”: if a is the same cat as b, a purrs if and only if b purrs. 
Call any RI-predicate that dominates every predicate dominant. Finally, call 
any non-dominant RI-predicate that reduces to a conjunction of domi-
nant RI-predicates and ordinary predicates redundant. The key claim of 
relative-identity theory—the RI-thesis—is that not every non-redundant 
RI-predicate is dominant.
3.1.2 Relative Identity and the Doctrine. Van Inwagen uses the RI-thesis to 
defend the Doctrine as follows. He starts with two undefined RI-predicates 
(“is the same being as” and “is the same person as”) and one undefined or-
dinary predicate (“is divine”). These predicates can be characterized (but 
15See McCall and Rea, Philosophical and Theological Essays on the Trinity; Rea, “Trinity”; 
Rea, Oxford Readings; Howard-Snyder, “Trinity”; and Tuggy, “Trinity.”
16A relation R is symmetric just if, for any x and y, if x bears R to y, then y bears R to x. A 
relation R is transitive just if, for any x, y, and z, if x bears R to y and if y bears R to z, then x 
bears R to z. A relation R is reflexive just if, for any x, x bears R to x.
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not defined) as follows: a being is anything that has causal powers, and a 
person is any being one can refer to using singular personal pronouns—a 
someone. Finally, to be divine is to be necessarily omnipotent, omniscient, 
perfectly loving, etc. In light of this, van Inwagen claims that anything 
divine is a being and person, which implies that something is a divine 
person if and only if it is a divine being.
So, (1) – (3) are initially paraphrased as:
(1RI) There is exactly one divine being.
(2RI) There are exactly three divine persons.
(3RI) Each divine person is a divine being.
Astute readers may notice that these paraphrases simply reiterate 
(1) – (3) while analyzing “God” as “divine being.” The real work done by 
Relative-Identity is in specifying how we should interpret these claims—
how we should understand and so formalize their logical properties. 
According to van Inwagen’s version of the Relative-Identity account, 
(1) – (3) should be formalized as:
(1RI*) ∃ x (x is divine ∧ ∀y (y is divine ⊃ y =being x))
(2RI*) ∃ x ∃ y ∃ z (x is divine ∧ y is divine ∧ z is divine ∧ x ≠person y ∧ x ≠person z 
∧ y ≠person z ∧ ∀w (w is divine ⊃ (w =person x ∨ w =person y ∨ w =person z)))
(3RI*) ∀x ((x is divine ∧ x =person x) ⊃ (x is divine ∧ x =being x))
Given the logic of relative identity, these claims are formally consistent. 
Of course, it is (to say the least) controversial that identity is relative, and 
hence that this “solution” to the Problem is any solution at all. Our purpose 
here, though, is just to show how this account makes use of paraphrase. 
Some might doubt that regimentations like (1RI*) – (3RI*) should be counted 
as paraphrases. But a regimentation is a logically more perspicuous refor-
mulation of a claim, and that’s the definition of “paraphrase.” And not just 
our definition: Quine himself describes the goal of regimentation as being 
to “paraphrase a sentence of ordinary language into logical symbols.”17 
Since Quine is a paradigmatic advocate of the paraphrase technique,18 we 
take it that there can be no argument that classifying regimentations as 
paraphrases is intolerably idiosyncratic.
That being said, controversy about relative identity leads to the fol-
lowing meta-worry about van Inwagen’s account: given that many 
intelligent and competent speakers deny that (1) – (3) can be properly 
regimented as (1RI*) – (3RI*), can it plausibly be maintained that the latter 
are correct (non-revising) paraphrases of the former? We will return to 
17Quine, Word, 159.
18Although Quine’s rejection of synonymy leads him to say some things about paraphrase 
that are rejected by later adherents of “Quinean meta-ontology” such as David Lewis and 
Peter van Inwagen.
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this question below. But before moving on, we would like to discuss an 
important development of van Inwagen’s account.
3.1.3 Brower and Rea. Brower and Rea contend that van Inwagen’s solu-
tion to the Problem is incomplete unless supplemented with a story about 
the metaphysics of relative-identity relations.19 According to the story they 
tell, there are hylomorphic compounds of form and matter. For example, 
Socrates is a hylomorphic compound of a rational soul and body. And 
when Socrates sits, there is an object that comes to be: sitting-Socrates, 
which is a hylomorphic compound of the sitting-accident as form and 
Socrates as matter. Finally, though Socrates is not (classically) identical 
to sitting-Socrates since they are discernible, Socrates is numerically the 
same as sitting-Socrates since they share the same matter. They are one in 
number but not in being: Socrates and sitting-Socrates are the same human 
being but different hylomorphic compounds, as we count human beings by 
identity of matter but we count hylomorphic compounds by identity. 
Brower and Rea apply this to the Doctrine as follows. While the divine 
persons are not hylomorphic compounds (they have no matter, since they 
are not material), they are like hylomorphic compounds. Each has a per-
sonal property that plays the role of form, and each has the divine nature 
that plays the role of matter. So, the Father is a compound of paternity and 
the divine nature, the Son is a compound of filiation and the divine nature, 
and the Spirit is a compound of passive spiration and the divine nature. To 
be a God is to be a compound of a personal property and a divine nature 
(a “divine compound”), and to be the same God is to have the same divine 
nature (numerically distinct divine compounds are the same God if they 
have the same divine nature). According to Brower and Rea,
x is a God iff x is a hylomorphic compound whose “matter” is some divine 
essence; x is the same God as y iff x and y are each hylomorphic compounds 
whose “matter” is some divine essence and x’s “matter” is the same “matter” 
as y’s.20
So, the Father and the Son are the same God but different divine persons, 
for we count Gods by identity of divine nature but we count divine per-
sons by identity. (1) – (3), then, would be paraphrased by Brower and Rea 
as follows:
(1BR) ∃x (x is a God ∧ ∀y (y is a God ⊃ y is numerically the same as x))
(2BR) ∃x∃y∃z (x is a divine person ∧ y is a divine person ∧ z is a divine 
person ∧ x ≠ y ∧ x ≠ z ∧ y ≠ z ∧ ∀w (w is a divine person ⊃ (w = x ∨ 
w = y ∨ w = z)))
(3BR) ∀x (x is a divine person ⊃ x is a God)
If numerical sameness is not identity, these claims are formally consistent.
19Brower and Rea, “Material Constitution.”
20Brower and Rea, “Material Constitution,” 142.
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3.2 Swinburne’s Social Trinitarian Account
According to Swinburne’s version of Social Trinitarianism, there are 
three divine beings—beings that are essentially omnipotent, omniscient, 
perfectly free, etc. And they differ in (active) causal relations: the Father 
essentially causes the Son to exist, and the Father and Son essentially 
co-cause the Spirit to exist. The Son, however, doesn’t cause the Father, 
and the Spirit causes neither the Father nor the Son. Nevertheless, they 
all depend on each other to exist and act—they can’t exist or act without 
each other. They are thus dependent: each depends on something outside 
itself. They do, however, compose an independent divine society—a so-
ciety that depends on nothing outside itself. Since its members are eternal 
and necessary, so is the society. And since its members are omnipotent, 
omniscient, and perfectly free, so (derivatively) is the society. The society 
is thus, in some important sense, divine.
For Swinburne, if we want to understand the Doctrine, we should ask 
how the Council members who formulated the Doctrine understood it. 
He writes,
If ‘there is only one God’ meant ‘there is only one divine individual’, then 
the doctrine of the Trinity would be manifestly self-contradictory. So clearly 
Church councils . . . must have understood ‘there is only one God’ in a some-
what subtler sense—since no person and no Council affirming something 
which they intend to be taken with utter seriousness can be read as affirming 
an evident contradiction. What in denying tritheism, the view that there are 
three Gods, were Councils ruling out? I suggest that they were denying that 
there were three independent divine beings, any of which could exist without 
the other; or which could act independently of each other. . . . But then how 
is the claim that each of the individuals is ‘God’ to be understood? Simply as 
the claim that each is divine—omnipotent, perfectly good, etc.21
Swinburne thus straightforwardly uses paraphrase to solve the 
Problem: he takes “God” to be ambiguous between “divine being” and 
“independent divine being,” and for (1) to use “God” in the latter sense 
while (3) uses “God” in the former sense. Once this is made explicit, there 
is no suggestion of contradiction:
(1ST) There is exactly one independent divine being (i.e., the divine soci-
ety).
(2ST) There are exactly three divine persons.
(3ST) Each divine person is a divine being.
There are many objections to Swinburne’s proposal: perhaps most 
importantly, it implies that in an important sense of “God”—the sense 
in which “the Father is God” is true—there is more than one God. Our 
21Swinburne, Christian God, 180–181. 
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purpose, however, is just to argue that it makes use of paraphrase. And 
this it clearly does.22
3.3 Leftow’s Latin Trinitarian Account
Leftow’s “Latin Trinitarian” account is best explained by analogy. Imagine 
that Jane, a Rockette dancer, travels back in time twice so that she can si-
multaneously perform three roles: that of leftmost, middle, and rightmost 
Rockette. The resulting performance would then involve only one being 
dancing on stage: Jane. But there would be a legitimate sense in which 
there are three dancers on stage: the leftmost, middle, and rightmost Rock-
ette. There are, then, two ways to count dancers: by beings that perform 
dance-roles and by dance-roles performed by beings. More generally, 
there are two ways to count Fs: by occupants of F-roles and by F-roles 
occupied. On the first way, since there’s only one being that dances, there’s 
only one dancer. On the second way, since there are three occupied dance-
roles, there are three dancers. So, on the second way, though there’s only 
one being that dances, and though each dancer is a being that dances, there 
are three dancers. As Leftow puts it:
There are at least two ways to count dancers. One simply counts the sub-
stances onstage. The other also counts substances, but counts them in terms 
of the roles they play, so that one substance counts as two dancers if playing 
two roles. Ordinarily, the dancers would not all be one woman, and so there 
would be many no matter which way we counted. So ordinarily, we needn’t 
bear in mind that there is more than one way to count dancers. But a time 
travel case isn’t ordinary, and given time travel, we must bear this in mind, 
for if we count by roles there are many dancers, but if we count by sub-
stances playing the roles there is just one. Given time travel, the two ways to 
count yield different results, and so if time travel became common, descrip-
tion of some situations might become more complicated, and we might want 
more information than we now do if we are to be confident we’re speaking 
accurately. But both ways of counting are perfectly ordinary; neither “runs 
counter to our normal ways of using language.”23
The analogy with the Trinity is clear: God is like Jane. There is only one 
divine living being, God, but that being lives His life in three streams, each 
of which counts as the life of a person. God is, as it were, playing three 
roles at once: that of Father, Son, and Spirit. On this account, there’s clearly 
only one divine being: God. But how many divine persons are there? We 
can count divine persons by counting divine beings that live a personal 
22One might think that Swinburne must be offering a revising rather than a reconciling 
paraphrase here, since one might think (1ST) isn’t logically equivalent to (1), since (1ST), but 
not (1), implies that there is an independent being. But Swinburne’s paraphrase is intended 
to be reconciling: he is arguing that (1) is misleading as to the logical properties of the claim 
that the Church Fathers were trying to assert, and that (1ST) is a more perspicuous expression 
of that claim. That is, he is arguing that (1ST) expresses the very same claim as—and hence a 
claim logically equivalent to—the claim that the Church Fathers were using (1) to express. 
Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing us to be clearer on this point.
23Leftow, “On Hasker,” 334.
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life or by counting personal lives lived by a divine being. On the first way, 
since there’s only one divine being, there’s only one divine person. On 
the second way, since there are three personal lives, there are three divine 
persons. So, on the second way, though there’s only one divine being, and 
though each divine person is a divine being, there are three divine persons.
How does Leftow’s account make use of paraphrase? On this view, the 
crucial step for rendering (1) – (3) consistent is distinguishing between 
the one divine being and the “personal lives” of Father, Son, and Spirit. 
(1) – (3) are then paraphrased as follows:
(1LT) There is exactly one divine being.
(2LT) There are exactly three divine “personal lives.”
(3LT) Each divine “personal life” is lived by a divine being.
(1LT) – (3LT) are clearly logically consistent. As with the other proposals, 
there are objections to Leftow’s: perhaps most importantly, it implies that 
in some sense there’s only one divine person. But again, our purpose here 
is just to argue that it makes use of paraphrase.24
4. The Master Argument
We have seen that all three of the main accounts of the Trinity rely on 
paraphrase. And indeed, we think that every coherent and orthodox ac-
count of the Trinity is committed, at least implicitly, to the success of some 
paraphrase. Consider again the Doctrine:
(1) There is exactly one God.
(2) There are exactly three divine persons.
(3) Each divine person is God.
The Problem is essentially that these claims seem inconsistent. There are 
only three possible responses to the Problem: Embrace Inconsistency, Es-
chew Orthodoxy, and Paraphrase.
Embrace Inconsistency: One might say that (1) – (3) really are inconsistent 
and accept them anyway. Perhaps this view can be attributed to certain 
Christian mystics, although we doubt it. If so, they are confused: this re-
sponse is incoherent, and so not a solution to the Problem at all.25 What 
might seem like a more plausible version of this strategy would be to say 
that while (1) – (3) are literally contradictory, they non-literally communicate 
24Leftow, “Modes without Modalism,” offers a related but different account, on which 
God generates three personal life streams, which in turn constitute three persons. This ac-
count involves different paraphrases and the objections we raise for Leftow’s account here do 
not obviously apply to this alternative account.
25At least if Dialetheism (the view that there are true contradictions) is false. But even 
Dialetheists think that only certain special contradictions are true, and it’s not obvious that 
the Doctrine is special in this way.
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or signify important theological truths. This, however, is really to Eschew 
Orthodoxy.26
Eschew Orthodoxy: One might say that (1) – (3) really are inconsistent 
and reject one or more of them. But this would involve rejecting Christian 
orthodoxy, as discussed in § 2.2. To deny (1) is to deny monotheism (“we 
believe in one God”). To deny (3) is to deny that the Father is God, the 
Son is God, or the Holy Spirit is God. But to deny that the Son is God is to 
commit the Arian heresy, to deny that the Holy Spirit is God is to commit 
the semi-Arian heresy, and to deny that the Father is God is to reject a 
central tenet of all Abrahamic religions. Finally, to deny (2) contradicts the 
First Council of Constantinople’s claim that the Father, Son, and Spirit are 
“three perfect persons,” a central teaching of almost all Christian denom-
inations.
Paraphrase: Finally, one might say that while the Doctrine seems incon-
sistent, it is not really inconsistent. Merely asserting this might be rational 
for some people,27 but it is not an attempt to actually solve the Problem: it 
is not an account of the Trinity. Even a proof that the Doctrine were true 
would only show that there is a solution to the Problem;28 it wouldn’t itself 
be a solution. A solution must allow us to see, at least through a glass 
darkly, how (1) – (3) are consistent, and paraphrase provides one way to do 
that. But we think that every way of doing that will rely, at least implicitly, 
on the success of some paraphrase. For example, some people hold that 
conceivability entails, or is evidence for, possibility. According to such 
people, conceiving of a situation where (1) – (3) are true would provide 
evidence that they’re consistent which might not seem to make use of 
paraphrase. We hold, however, that the only way to conceive of (1) – (3) 
being true is to conceive of a situation where some semantically, logically, 
or metaphysically equivalent set of sentences—i.e., paraphrases—such as 
(1LT) – (3LT), are true, so the purported contrast between conceivability and 
paraphrase is spurious.29 Likewise, we sometimes demonstrate the consis-
tency of some set of sentences S by providing a “model” of the sentences 
in S. But providing a model of S is, in effect, to provide a reinterpretation 
26Assuming that the Doctrine consists of sentences. If it consists of propositions non-lit-
erally “expressed” by (1) – (3), this approach might not be revisionary. However, it then 
becomes less clear that we know what the Doctrine is—that we have actually latched onto 
the relevant non-literal “contents” of (1) – (3). In any case, the considerations mentioned in 
connection with Eschewing Orthodoxy would seem to indicate that defenders of the Doc-
trine had better take (1) – (3) to be literally true.
27This is roughly what Tuggy calls “Positive Mysterianism” (“On Positive Mysterianism”).
28Swinburne, Christian God, ch. 8, gives a “proof” of the Doctrine, but his argument relies 
on controversial and uncertain principles, as Swinburne himself acknowledges. 
29If we could “directly” conceive of a situation where (1) – (3) were true, they wouldn’t 
seem inconsistent! (On the other hand, if “direct conception” is allowed to be theory-laden, 
such that it makes sense to think that we may eventually be able to “directly conceive” the 
joint possibility of (1) – (3) via the lens of theory T, this is in no tension with the fact that 
(1) – (3) now seem inconsistent. But in this case, we hold that “direct conception via the lens 
of theory T” will involve a commitment to the success of some paraphrase proposal—a pro-
posal that states (1) – (3) in the language of T.)
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of S with the same “logical form,” so a model-theoretic consistency argu-
ment will still employ, in effect, Stages 1 and 2 of the paraphrase strategy 
outlined above. (And as noted there, to provide a model of a statement 
one must already know its logical form, but disputes about the Trinity are 
disputes about the Doctrine’s logical form.) Finally, as argued at the end 
of § 3.1.2, regimentations are a form of paraphrase, so any solution to the 
Problem that involves regimentation or logical revision—relative identity 
solutions, most obviously, but also other logically heterodox views30—will 
invariably involve or be committed to paraphrases (regimentations) of 
(1) – (3).
So, we are inclined to think that any solution to the Problem is at least 
implicitly committed to there being reformulations of (1) – (3) that indicate 
that they are merely apparently inconsistent—e.g., that provide evidence 
that (1) – (3) are consistent after all. But these would just be reconciling 
paraphrases. Hence, we think that any coherent and orthodox account of 
the Trinity must appeal, at least implicitly, to that technique.
Here is another way of putting the point. Naively, (1) – (3) would be 
regimented as:
(1N) ∃x (x is a God ∧ ∀y (y is a God ⊃ y = x))
(2N) ∃x∃y∃z (x is a divine person ∧ y is a divine person ∧ z is a divine 
person ∧ x ≠ y ∧ x ≠ z ∧ y ≠ z ∧ ∀w (w is a divine person ⊃ (w = x ∨ 
w = y ∨ w = z)))
(3N) ∀x (x is a divine person ⊃ x is a God)
But (1N) – (3N) really are inconsistent, so long as the predicates are inter-
preted uniformly. So, any coherent and orthodox account of the Trinity is 
at least implicitly committed to a non-standard regimentation of (1) – (3). 
But, as argued above, a non-standard regimentation is a form of para-
phrase.31 While it’s often acknowledged that any solution to the Problem 
will (implicitly or explicitly) involve regimenting (1) – (3), we are arguing 
that this fact has some un- or under-appreciated implications for theo-
rizing about the Trinity.
5. Complications
We have seen that for an account of the Doctrine to be orthodox, the 
paraphrases involved must be reconciling rather than revising. Such 
30Such as the plural logic solution defended in Bohn, “Logic of the Trinity.” Bohn’s view 
also involves paraphrase in a more trivial sense: he paraphrases (3) as (3PL) God = the Father, 
the Son, the Holy Spirit, where “the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit” is a plural term and ‘=’ 
is interpreted collectively. See Bohn, “Logic of the Trinity,” for further discussion.
31More carefully: a regimentation is, or is a recipe for constructing, a logically more per-
spicuous reconciling paraphrase. One could describe the logical form of a statement without 
actually regimenting it, of course. But one’s description of that logical form will correspond 
to some regimentation, and the accuracy of that description will stand or fall with the ac-
ceptability of that regimentation. This is the sense in which every purported solution to the 
Problem is at least implicitly tied to the success of some paraphrase.
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reconciling paraphrases often aim to be semantically, logically, or meta-
physically equivalent to the sentences they paraphrase, but we saw that 
this is not necessary: paraphrases that semantically, logically, or meta-
physically entail the sentences they paraphrase will work as well. Since 
semantic equivalence entails logical and metaphysical equivalence, argu-
ments about the legitimacy of various paraphrase proposals often focus 
on the question of semantic equivalence. That normally does no harm, but 
it is wise to keep the actual necessary conditions on successful paraphrase 
in mind.
Since there are some semantically equivalent (i.e., synonymous) sen-
tences, there are some successful paraphrases.32 It is even plausible that 
there are some philosophically interesting successful paraphrases: ordi-
nary speakers will typically grant that, e.g., “There is a crack in my favorite 
vase” and “My favorite vase is cracked” are two ways of saying the same 
thing.33 In many cases, however, paraphrase proposals are less intuitive: 
ordinary speakers will almost universally deny that, e.g., “There’s a chair 
in Izzy’s closet” and “There are some simples arranged chair-wise in Izzy’s 
closet” are two ways of saying the same thing.34 In such “hard cases,” the 
paraphraser must tell a meta-semantic story (a story about how expres-
sions get their meanings) that makes it plausible that, e.g., “There’s a chair 
in Izzy’s closet” comes to express the same proposition as, or a proposition 
true in the same worlds as, “There are some simples arranged chair-wise 
in Izzy’s closet.” We think that, given certain not implausible presupposi-
tions, such meta-semantic stories can in principle be told.35 But they raise 
additional complications. In what follows, we investigate the prospects 
for “easy” and “hard” paraphrases of (1) – (3).
5.1 Easy Paraphrases?
The easiest cases of paraphrase involve “loose talk” and other locutions 
used out of convenience or sloppiness: cases where, broadly speaking, we 
don’t say what we mean. For example, people often say things like “I’m 
parked in the Gallagher lot” as a sort of convenient abbreviation for “My 
car is parked in the Gallagher lot.”36 In the present context, however, we 
are talking about a carefully formulated theological doctrine: one it would 
be difficult to argue is a case of loose talk or not saying what one means. 
There still might be an “easy” paraphrase, however, if ordinary speakers or 
some relevant class of theologians agree that the paraphrased statements 
32At least assuming that not every pair of synonymous sentences is equally perspicuous.
33See Keller, “Paraphrase and the Symmetry.”
34See van Inwagen, Material Beings.
35See Keller, “Paraphrase, Semantics, and Ontology.” 
36Is this a revising or reconciling paraphrase? Well, the two sentences plausibly differ 
in semantic meaning, but “My car is parked in the Gallagher lot” expresses the claim one 
presumably originally believed and intended to communicate by uttering “I’m parked in the 
Gallagher lot.” So, while this paraphrase might involve a revision in what one (literally) says, 
it does not involve a revision in what one believes.
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and their paraphrases are two ways of saying the same thing. In § 6 we 
consider whether this is the case with any of the three main accounts of 
the Trinity.
5.2 Hard Paraphrases?
When it’s counterintuitive that a statement and its paraphrase mean the 
same thing, the paraphraser must provide some sort of explanation for 
why our intuitions are wrong (or at least why the paraphrase is logically 
or metaphysically equivalent to the paraphrased). One strategy is to tell a 
meta-semantic story that makes such unintuitive paraphrases credible.37 
Finding such a story is often difficult, however, and those difficulties are 
magnified in the present case, since (1) – (3) are not “ordinary language” 
assertions, but precisely formulated theological doctrines. The meta-se-
mantic theses that make some “hard” paraphrases plausible often hinge 
on the fact that ordinary language is loose and accommodating: ordinary 
language locutions aren’t intended to be perspicuous representations of the 
underlying metaphysics of the world, and so they plausibly aren’t required 
to be perspicuous in order to be true, as long as they represent the world 
as it is.38 Carefully formulated metaphysical doctrines, on the other hand, 
are generally intended to be perspicuous in this sense. While theology isn’t 
analytic metaphysics, it is more like analytic metaphysics than ordinary 
language, and this creates an obstacle for making initially implausible 
paraphrases more plausible upon further reflection, including further re-
flection on the meta-semantics of theological language.
6. Implications
How does all of this bear on the paraphrase proposals we looked at in 
§ 3? We do not have the space to answer this question properly—that task 
would require a paper, or three, unto itself. Our goal here is merely to 
sketch the beginnings of an answer in order to show that the full answer 
is likely to be interesting and important. We will focus on two questions:
(1) Would ordinary speakers (or some relevant class of theologians) 
grant that the paraphrases are simply two different ways of say-
ing the same thing? Are the paraphrases “easy” (intuitively con-
tent-preserving)?
(2) For paraphrases that are “hard” (not intuitively content-preserving), 
is there a plausible meta-semantic story to be told about why the 
37A complication arises from the fact that whether a meta-semantic story is credible de-
pends on (what one takes to be) the correct theory of the world. Recall the discussion of 
Berkeley in § 2.
38“The average mother has 2.4 children” and “The number of children divided by the 
number of mothers is 2.4” are metaphysically, but not semantically, equivalent; we take it 
that the latter is a more perspicuous representation of reality than the former, since, despite 
functioning grammatically like a referring expression, there is nothing to which “the average 
mother” refers.
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paraphrased statements have the same truth-conditions as the 
paraphrases (more carefully, about why they are logically or meta-
physically weaker than or equivalent to the paraphrases)?
6.1 Van Inwagen
Perhaps surprisingly, we think that the relative-identity paraphrases are 
easy cases. While contemporary philosophers and mathematicians often 
find relative identity counterintuitive, we submit that ordinary folk and 
theologians 1,000 years ago (or today) would find nothing surprising in the 
account of “sameness” given by Relative-Identity theorists. They would 
certainly find nothing surprising about claiming that, e.g., if I made two 
sculptures out of the same hunk of Play-Doh (in sequence), sculpture-one 
might be a different sculpture than sculpture-two, despite the fact that 
sculpture-one is the same hunk of clay as sculpture-two. Of course, there 
are puzzles about just how to make accounts like this work smoothly, but 
those aren’t problems about conflict with ordinary usage. The folk gen-
erally just do not use “same” to mean identity as understood by classical 
logicians: relative identity is “deviant” relative to contemporary philo-
sophical orthodoxy, but not ordinary use. Paraphrases like (1RI) – (3RI) might 
seem revisionary to those of us who learned classical logic on our mother’s 
knee, but that’s not everyone, and critically, it’s not the theologians who 
were struggling to formulate (what are now) the canonical statements of 
the Doctrine in the first place. After all, those theologians antedated the 
advent of classical logic by a thousand years. Of course, that doesn’t mean 
that (1) – (3) don’t seem surprising to ordinary folk. But that’s not because 
they find relative identity surprising; it’s because they find the relative 
identity relations attributed to the divine persons by (1RI) – (3RI) surprising.
6.2 Swinburne
Swinburne’s paraphrases fare less well along this metric. We suspect that 
ordinary folk and theologians, now or 1,000 years ago, would balk at the 
claim that, if Christianity is true, there’s an important sense in which the 
Father is not God (the sense of “God” in which monotheism is true). So, 
Swinburne’s paraphrases are not “easy.” There also does not seem to be an 
obvious meta-semantic story about how the word “God” could have come 
to be associated with the two different meanings Swinburne postulates 
(“independent divine being” and “divine being”). Traditionally, it was not 
part of the meaning of “god” that gods were independent in Swinburne’s 
sense: it was a substantive claim that the God of Abraham was indepen-
dent. Furthermore, if there were two uses of “God” in play it would be 
peculiar for the Doctrine to have been formulated in such a needlessly 
confusing manner.
On the other hand, Swinburne claims that,
There is an ambiguity in the Greek and Latin of the creeds, which justifies 
a different understanding of θεóς and deus (normally both translated into 
English as ‘God’) in different places in the creeds. . . . Given this ambiguity, 
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it is not implausible to read the creeds as asserting that three divine indi-
viduals (in my sense) together constitute one God (in my sense). The creeds 
are less paradoxical in Greek or Latin than their English translation makes 
them.39
If this were relevantly true, it would provide powerful support for Swin-
burne’s paraphrases. But in the Athanasian Creed, for example, the Latin 
that is translated as “the Father is God, the Son God, the Holy Spirit God; 
and yet there are not three Gods, but there is one God”40 uniformly uses 
“deus” (and its cognates): Ita Deus Pater, Deus Filius, Deus Spiritus Sanctus. 
Et tamen non tres dii, sed unus est Deus. Of course, this doesn’t show that 
“deus” is unambiguous, but the appearance of contradiction does not dis-
appear in the original Latin, as Swinburne seems to suggest. Furthermore, 
the Athanasian Creed contains multiple phrases of the form “the Father 
is X, the Son is X, the Holy Spirit is X; and yet there are not three Xs, 
but there is one X,” where “eternal” (aeternus), “almighty” (omnipotentes), 
“Lord” (Dominus), and so on are substituted for “X.” Since “aeternus,” 
“omnipotentes,” “Dominus,” etc. are not ambiguous, it can’t generally be 
true that claims of the form “the Father is X, the Son is X, the Holy Spirit 
is X; and yet there are not three Xs, but there is one X” are supposed to 
be read with “X” having a different meaning in its last appearance, which 
suggests that “deus” is supposed to be interpreted the same in “sed unus est 
Deus” as it is in “Ita Deus Pater, Deus Filius, Deus Spiritus Sanctus.”
6.3. Leftow
Leftow’s paraphrases also don’t seem to be “easy”: it just doesn’t seem true 
that we can “count persons” by counting beings that live personal lives 
or by counting personal lives lived by beings, and there isn’t an obvious 
meta-semantic story about why that seeming is not veridical. We grant 
that if time-travel became common we might start counting persons this 
way. But time travel isn’t common, and so our linguistic practices have not 
evolved to accommodate it. What Leftow needs and indeed claims is that 
our counting practices wouldn’t need to evolve to accommodate time travel: 
that we already count things, or at least persons, in the way he suggests.
Is this the case? We think not. Imagine some small town containing 
three restaurants: one serving breakfast, one serving lunch, and one 
serving dinner. Suppose the town’s one and only chef works at all three 
restaurants. How many chefs are there in town? There is only one answer, 
and the answer is “one”: the number we get by counting beings that are 
chefs, not “chef roles” occupied by beings. Likewise, if a student is taking 
all three of her courses from Prof. Smith, there is only one answer to the 
question “How many professors does the student have this semester?,” 
and the answer is “one”: the number we get by counting beings that are 
professors, not “professor roles” occupied by beings. Even if there are some 
39Swinburne, Christian God, 181–182.
40Kelly, Athanasian Creed, 18.
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predicates such that the bearers of those predicates can be counted in the 
two ways Leftow suggests—what we might call “dual predicates”—other 
predicates, including “person,” are not dual. Even if ordinary English al-
lows us to say that there are three dancers on stage, it requires us to say that 
there is only one person up there.
It is important that we get this result using Leftow’s own example, since 
whether a predicate is dual plausibly depends on context. If we ask how 
many students a professor has, where we are interested in the professor’s 
workload, it is natural to “double count” students in more than one of the 
professor’s classes: to count student roles occupied by beings, rather than 
beings that occupy student roles. However, if we were interested in the 
number of students that a professor knows personally, we would count 
beings that occupy student roles rather than student roles occupied by be-
ings. Is there any context where we would “count persons” by person roles 
occupied by beings? The best case we can come up with is an amendment 
of Leftow’s Rockette case: perhaps fire-department code only allows “two 
people on stage” at any given time. If, upon being written up for a code 
violation, the club owner protested that there was really only one person 
on stage during Jane’s performance, the club owner’s protest would be 
rightly dismissed. But this isn’t because it’s literally true that there was 
more than one person on stage during the performance. Rather, it seems 
clear that this is because the intent of the law obviously has to do with 
overcrowding: it has to do with how much space is taken up by the people 
on stage. If, instead of being a time traveler, Jane performed her routine 
via some sort of tri-location, the code violation would be just as clear as in 
the time-traveler case. But we take it that in the case of tri-location there is 
obviously no sense in which there are literally three people on stage. So, 
the aptness of the code violation does not require it to be literally true that 
there were more than two people on stage. Hence, even this “best case” 
does not support the conclusion that “person” has a dual interpretation.
But perhaps Leftow could argue that “person” in ordinary English 
does not mean the same thing as “prosōpon” in the mouths of those who 
formulated the Doctrine. This wouldn’t be a meta-semantic story where 
ordinary uses of “person” are amenable to counting in the dual way Leftow 
suggests. Rather, it would be a story about what the Church Fathers who 
were responsible for formulating the Doctrine intended to be saying when 
they said there were three divine persons. Thus, it may be possible for 
Leftow to argue that there is a significant gap between how the Church 
Fathers thought about prosōpa and how we think about persons: a gap that 
warrants thinking that (1LT) – (3LT) are what the Church Fathers meant to 
communicate when saying things like (1) – (3). What is crucial for Leftow’s 
account is that “prosōpon,” as used by the Church Fathers, is dual—not that 
“person” is. We simply note here that Leftow hasn’t given any argument 
for this claim; his examples focus, rather, on count nouns in English. And 
we’re skeptical that such an argument is there to be made: if “prosōpon” 
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were dual, wouldn’t philologists have told us by now? We remain open to 
correction on this matter, however.
7. Conclusion
There is, of course, much more to be said about paraphrase and the Trinity: 
our aim here has just been to lay the groundwork for future research. We 
have argued that for anyone wishing to defend the traditional Doctrine, it 
is important to attend—with an eye to the distinction between revising and 
reconciling paraphrases—to the plausibility of the paraphrases to which 
her theory is committed. Furthermore, we have tentatively concluded that 
explicit consideration of the nature of paraphrase provides support for 
Relative-Identity as against Social or Latin Trinitarian accounts. We are 
not, of course, making any claim about the other philosophical or theolog-
ical hurdles facing these views, or their overall merits and demerits. We 
are merely pointing out that insofar as we are interested in showing that 
the Doctrine is consistent, rather than replacing it with something consis-
tent, both Social and Latin Trinitarians face a hurdle that Relative-Identity 
Theorists do not. Our more general and important conclusion is that ex-
plicit thought about paraphrase is important for evaluating accounts of 
the Trinity.41
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